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Notes and Comments
COMPENSATION FOR NEGLIGENTLY
SHORTENED LIFE EXPECTANCY
In a civil suit for negligently inflicted personal injuries "[t]he
cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law"' is that of
compensation of the plaintiff for his injuries. While courts and juries
in assessing damages are undoubtedly influenced in varying degrees
by the extent of a defendant's culpability, the theoretical purpose of
an award of damages is to make the plaintiff as nearly whole as
possible by an award of money - to place him in the position he
occupied before the accident. Thus, if the defendant has negligently
caused the loss of plaintiff's arm, the law will ideally seek to com-
pensate the plaintiff for his costs of medical care and rehabilitation,
his lost earnings, his physical pain, and any severe mental suffering
caused by the injury.
Consider, however, the possibility that, as a result of the injury
and the attendant physical and emotional stress, the victim's life ex-
pectancy has been shortened by five years. Progress in the medical
and actuarial sciences renders expert testimony to this effect increas-
ingly more accurate and available. Will damages be awarded to com-
pensate for this loss? The answer, surprisingly, is not dictated by the
doctrine of proximate cause, as might be expected. In fact, the ques-
tion is not properly raised until after the evidence has satisfactorily
demonstrated that the curtailment of the plaintiff's normal life ex-
pectancy was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. Will
the jury be instructed to make an award for the lost expectancy irre-
spective of any pecuniary losses sustained thereby and regardless of
any increase in the burden of mental suffering occasioned by know-
ledge of premature death? The courts of England have said yes; the
courts in this country have consistently said no.
THE BRITISH CASES
In the 1808 case of Baker v. Bolton,2 Lord Ellenborough, whose
forte, according to Prosser, was never common sense,' stated by way
of dictum that "in a civil Court, the death of a human being could
not be complained of as an injury .... ". Enshrined in the common
law by virtue of a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis,5
this offhand remark effectively rendered it cheaper for a wrong-doer
to kill his victim than to maim him, since no damages were recover-
able by the bereaved family.' This absurd and intolerable situation
was remedied in England by the passage of the Fatal Accidents Act of
1. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 25.1, at 1299 (1956).
2. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). See also Higgins v. Butcher, 123 Eng. Rep.
756 (Com. Pl. 1607).
3. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 121, at 924 (3d ed. 1964).
4. 170 Eng. Rep. at 1033.
5. See, e.g., Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Americka, [1917] A.C. 38.
6. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 121, at 923 (3d ed. 1964).
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1846,7 known as Lord Campbell's Act, the prototype of many Ameri-
can wrongful death statutes. The Act created a new cause of action
in favor of dependents of the deceased for any pecuniary losses suf-
fered as a result of his death. In 1934, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act s expanded the remedies available upon death by pro-
viding that any cause of action which had been vested in the deceased
prior to his death was to survive for the benefit of his estate. Though
apparently thus dispatched by Parliament, Lord Ellenborough's dictum
continued to cast its shadow over an area in the law where its appli-
cation made even less sense than in its original context - the problem
of the living plaintiff with a tortiously diminished life span.'
Logically, to reduce a man's life span is merely to accelerate the
moment of his death."0 No man, in the nature of things, can have a
cause of action for his own death. Even where such a cause of action
is given by statute to his dependents, the damages awarded are not
for loss of life but for pecuniary losses sustained by them by virtue
of his death. Therefore, the argument runs, to award the living plain-
tiff damages for loss of expectation of life is to give "to the shortening
of life an efficacy which is denied to its extinction, and to death in the
future an efficacy which is denied to death on the instant."" This
theory was argued in the famous case of Flint v. Lovell," in which a
prosperous, vigorous man of seventy, with a normal life expectancy
of eight to ten years, was severely injured by the defendant's auto-
mobile and reduced to ". . . a precarious tenure not likely to exceed
twelve months. . ."" In the House of Lords, the argument against
recovery was flatly rejected as having no bearing on a case in which
the plaintiff is still alive at the date of the trial, and an award of
£4000 for the loss was upheld.
Although there were earlier decisions in which awards were
given for curtailment of life expectancy,' 4 Flint is almost universally
regarded as the landmark case on the subject since it explicitly held,
for the first time, that such a cause of action could be maintained. Yet
Flint merely opened a Pandora's box of perplexing questions which
were to bedevil the English bench and bar. It was indisputable that
the House of Lords had upheld a substantial award to Mr. Flint for
something which had to do with his loss of "the prospect of an enjoy-
7. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
8. 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41.
9. See Smith, Psychic Interest in Continuation of One's Own Life: Legal
Recognition and Protection, 98 U. PA. L. Riv. 781 (1950), for a discussion of the
"irrelevance of the common-law rules concerning the jural effects of death" to the
current topic of shortening of life.
10. See Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1940).
11. Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354, 367.
12. [1935] 1 K.B. 354, noted in 51 L.Q. Riv. 268 (1935). See Annot., 97 A.L.R.
823 (1935); Annot., 131 A.L.R. 1351 (1941) ; Hannigan, Recent English Decisions
in Damages for Injuries Resulting in Premature Death, 18 B.U.L. REv. 275 (1938).
13. [19351 1 K.B. at 359.
14. See, e.g., Reid v. Lanarkshire Traction Co., [1934] Sess. Cas. 79, [1934] Scots
L.T.R. 54; McGarry v. Canada West Coal Co., 2 Alta. 229 (1909). One often finds
the case of Phillips v. London & South Western Ry., 5 Q.B.D. 78 (1879), cited as
the earliest English case permitting independent recovery for shortening of life. How-
ever, a close reading of the case seems to indicate that the court discussed "the prospect
of a speedy death" only in the context of the mental suffering occasioned by the injury.
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able . . . old age,"" but it was far from clear just what this "some-
thing" for which compensation had been given really was. Was the
"amputation of life substance" 6 an absolute loss to be compensated
in the same manner as loss of a limb? Or were the damages awarded
in the nature of a solatium to the stricken plaintiff for the increased
burden of mental anguish which knowledge of his premature death
would naturally produce?
In Slater v. Spreag,1 7 the latter rationale was adopted. In that
case, the victim of a motor accident died two days later without having
regained consciousness. The court refused to award damages for
shortening of life, explaining that such damages could be awarded
only if the plaintiff were aware of his loss. The court concluded,
therefore: "If a man does not retain consciousness, I do not think
that any damages for the shortening of life can be awarded."'
This interpretation suffers from a double handicap. Theoretically, it
could be argued through an extension of this rationale that of two
men deprived of an equal span of life, one comatose, the other alert,
the latter, by being forced to endure an awareness of his loss, had
sustained the greater injury, and was, therefore, entitled to the greater
compensation. This argument, however forceful theoretically, is met
with an almost visceral opposition, an uneasy feeling that it simply
isn't fair to permit a wrongdoer to escape with lighter damages because,
fortuitously, he had rendered his victim senseless. In Rose v. Ford,9
the argument proved too unpalatable for the House of Lords. A
twenty-three year old woman, struck by the defendant's car, remained
in a coma for four days before she died. Her father, as administrator,
brought an action under both the Fatal Accidents Act and the Law
Reform Act of 1934. The trial judge refused to allow damages for
loss of expectation of life on the grounds that no mental suffering
had been caused thereby. The Court of Appeals and the House of
Lords agreed that this approach was wrong. The loss sustained by
the deceased was deemed to be in the nature of an absolute loss. A
claim for damages had vested in her prior to her death, and, under
the Act of 1934, passed to her personal representative. In upholding
an award of £1000 suggested as appropriate by the Court of Appeals,
Lord Wright expressed his "feelings" on the matter in this way:
[A] man has a legal right in his own life. I think he has a
legal interest entitling him to complain if the integrity of his life
is impaired by tortious acts, not only in regard to pain, suffering,
and disability, but also in regard to the continuance of life for
its normal expectancy. A man has a legal right that his life
should not be shortened by the tortious act of another. His
15. [1935] 1 K.B. at 355. As a matter of fact, Mr. Flint was apparently still alive
three years later, as a discussion between counsel and the court disclosed in Morgan
v. Scoulding, [1938] 1 K.B. 786, 789.
16. Smith, Psychic Interest In Continuation of One's Own Life: Legal Recog-
nition and Protection, 98 U. PA. L. Rzv. 781 n.1 (1950).
17. [1936] 1 K.B. 83.
18. Id. at 89.
19. [1937] A.C. 826, noted in 49 HARV. L. Rav. 482 (1936).
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normal expectancy of life is a thing of temporal value, so that
its impairment is something for which damages should be given.2 °
The Slater rationale was also open to the practical objection that
it interfered with the even-handed distribution of justice; it operated
as a bar to the recovery of a wide variety of plaintiffs who, by force
of circumstances, were not fully aware of their loss, yet permitted
recovery in other cases of no greater discernible merit. By holding
as it did in Rose v. Ford, the House of Lords opened the way for
recovery not merely by comatose victims, but also by children too
young to appreciate the fear of impending death,2 by those victims
who were killed instantaneously, 22 by those rendered insane as a result
of the injuries sustained in the accident, 23 and by those adults from
whom the truth about their condition was withheld by family and physi-
cians.24 So completely had the theory of "objective" loss triumphed
that in 1939, in Ellis v. Raine,25 a new trial was ordered when the
jury, disregarding the instructions of the trial judge, failed to award
any damages for loss of life expectancy.
Having come this far, after determining that an action for the
loss of life was not precluded by Baker v. Bolton,26 and that the loss
was to be compensated per se, regardless of the victim's state of mind,
the courts were confronted with the most baffling, yet most crucial
problem of all - that of the proper measure of damages to be awarded
in any given case. It requires no particular philosophical insight to
appreciate what an awesome task it is to affix a price tag to a human
life. At worst, there is something vaguely obscene about the attempt,
something redolent of the slave markets of yesteryear. At best, it is
a subject more fit ". . for discussion in an essay on Aristotelian
ethics than in . . . a Court of law." 2 However, as Lord Wright
stated simply in Rose v. Ford: "[I]t is the best the law can do. It
would be paradoxical if the law refused to give any compensation at
all, because none could be adequate."2
Bemused judges, aware that no precise formula for admeasure-
ment could be devised, yet committed to the making of the calculation,
submitted the issue to juries with a minimum of analysis and a mild
20. [1937] A.C. at 847-48.
21. See, e.g., Trubyfield v. Great Western Ry., [1937] 4 All E.R. 614 (K.B.)
(8 year old) ; Shepherd v. Hunter, [1938] 2 All E.R. 587 (C.A.) (3 year old) ; Baily
v. Howard, [1939] 1 K.B. 453 (3 year old).
22. See, e.g., Morgan v. Scoulding, [1938] 1 K.B. 786 (23 year old killed in-
stantaneously, yet cause of action vested in decedent during instant between impact
and death so as to survive to his estate).
23. See, e.g., Roach v. Yates, [1938] 1 K.B. 256 (33 year old bricklayer rendered
totally helpless for life as a result of accident, suffering from traumatic dementia,
traumatic epilepsy, incontinence, impotence, headaches, giddiness, excessive thirst,
fibrosis of the lung and weakness of legs).
24. Lord Wright referred to such a victim, whose cancer condition was aggravated
by the accident, in his remarks in Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 849.
25. [1939] 2 K.B. 180.
26. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). See note 2 supra.
27. Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157, 166 (Viscount Simon).
28. [1937] A.C. at 848.
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exhortation to be dispassionate and conservative in their estimates.2 9
However, awards fluctuated so wildly in amount3 0 that it became
obvious that "juries [were] not all acting on the same principles.'
Once again, the difficulty centered on the question of exactly what it
was that the jury was expected to quantify. Was it the victim's sub-
jective evaluation of the worth of his own life? Did "Diogenes [have]
the same claim to be indemnified for the loss of the good things of
this earth which he despised as . . . Alexander who valued them
highly ?''32 Was the loss more grievous to the rich than to the poor,
to the healthy than to the infirm, or was the jury by "necromancy
and crystal-gazing .. .sanctioned in the law . . . [to] forecast one's
future state of happiness"3 3 based on its own objective estimate of
the victim's prospects? Was it the actual number of the lost years
which was to be compensated or their content, whether objectively
or subjectively appraised? Were damages to be strictly proportionate
to the temporal dimensions of the loss so that, a priori, the younger
the victim, the more generous the award, 4 or were the greater uncer-
tainties attendant upon the future of a very young child to exert a
countervailing influence ?35
In Benham v. Gambling,36 the House of Lords had before it a
claim by the administrator of a two and one-half year old child who,
29. See, e.g., remarks of Scott, L.J., in Baily v. Howard, [1939] 1 K.B. 453, 458-59:
a .. I see no means of arriving at any sort of quantitative scale for the guid-
ance of judges or juries except the gradual working out, chiefly through the
common sense of juries, of the sort of figures that in English civilization of to-day
are to be regarded as reasonable. . . . [Tihe amount to be given should always
be strictly reasonable, and, if it errs at all, should err on the low side.
This appeal to the common sense of the jury has been likened to "the imprecation of
a divinity by a magician in despair." Kahn-Freund, Expectation of Happiness, 5 MoD.
L. Rtv. 81, 88 (1941).
30. Cf. Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354 (70 year old man - £4000) ; Feay v.
Barnwell, [1938] 1 All E.R. 31 (K.B.) (71 year old woman - £600); Morgan v.
Scoulding, [1938] 1 K.B. 786 (23 year old man - £1000) ; Shepherd v. Hunter, [1938]
2 All E.R. 587 (C.A.) (3 year old child - £90). See also Note, Damages for Loss
of Life Expectancy, 33 ILL. L. Rlv. 967 (1939).
31. Ellis v. Raine, [1939] 2 K.B. 180, 184: "[Ilt is quite clear that juries are not
all acting on the same principles, and it may be that ultimately Parliament will have
to intervene ... "
32. Kahn-Freund, Expectation of Happiness, 5 MOD. L. Rtv. 81, 86 (1941).
33. Comment, Damages for Shortened Life, 10 FORD. L. Rgv. 219, 228, 229 (1941).
34. In The Aizkarai Mendi, [1938] P. 263, the registrar below gave £150 to the
representatives of each of several seamen killed at sea, without regard to the age of
the deceased. On appeal, Langton J., stated: "I cannot bring myself to believe that
in any question of expectation of life the factor of age can be entirely negligible. I
appreciate fully that this age or time factor is not to be handled arithmetically ...
Nevertheless, the very notion of expectation seems to me to connote time .. " Id
at 276. He then divided the claims into 3 age groups: 23-26, 35-37, 41-44, awarding
them respectively £400, £350, and £300. See also Note, Measure of Damages in Fatal
Accidents, 13 MOD. L. Rgv. 508 (1950).
35. See, e.g., Trubyfield v. Great Western Ry., [1937] 4 All E.R. 614, 616 (K.B.)
[I]n the case of a very young infant, it must be that the calculation of the
exigencies and incidents of life would materially decrease the amount that would
be given, whereas, in the case of an infant who has outlived the dangers of childish
ailments . . .it may very well be that that child's outlook has been clarified, and
therefore it may look upon an entirely unclouded vista of life. . . . I cannot
imagine that the years of childhood and adolescence ... are purely a debit.
See also Shepherd v. Hunter, [1938] 2 All E.R. 587 (C.A.).
36. [1941] A.C. 157.
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after an accident, died without regaining consciousness. That Chamber
strove mightily to furnish some rational guidelines for future ven-
tures into this most bewildering corner of the law. It was primarily
concerned with establishing that, henceforth, awards of damages be
governed by ". . . a lower standard of measurement than has hitherto
prevailed for what is in fact incapable of being measured in coin of
the realm with any approach to real accuracy." 3 To this end, the
strictly actuarial test was to be avoided, since ". . . the thing to be
valued is not the prospect of length of days, but the prospect of a pre-
dominantly happy life." 38 The jury was to disregard the subjective
views of the victim and make its own ". . . objective estimate of
what kind of future on earth the victim might have enjoyed, whether
he has justly estimated that future or not."' 39 Yet, in forming this
objective estimate, the jury was not to be swayed by the individual's
social position or financial worth since these furnished no sure indicia
of happiness and since "damages [were] in respect of loss of life, not
of loss of future pecuniary prospects."4 Where the case involved an
infant who had not "passed the risks and uncertainties of childhood,"'"
a smaller award was called for than in the case of an adult who had
"in some degree attained to an established character and to firmer
hopes." 42 In this "linguistic alembic by a process almost alchemical,"4 3
the Lords arrived at the sum of £200 as the proper figure to which
the administrator was entitled.
Benham is most frequently cited, not for the guidelines which it
sought to provide, but for the ceiling which it effectively clamped on
the awards for this category of damages. It is viewed as an admission
of defeat by the House of Lords, an attempt to emasculate a rule
which, though grown totally ungovernable, it was powerless to over-
throw.44 Thereafter, the compensation of loss of life expectancy de-
generated into a system of nominal awards, almost always pegged to
the magic figure of £500, the depreciation in the value of the pound
notwithstanding.4 5 A wry footnote to this peculiar experiment in the
law is to be found in the recently-voiced hope of Lord Devlin that
Parliament would come to the rescue of the judiciary by enacting a
37. Id. at 168.
38. Id. at 166.
39. Id. at 167.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW &
CONTZMP. PROB. 219, 226 (1953).
44. The House of Lords never reverses itself or overrules precedents. See Kahn-
Freund, Expectation of Happiness, 5 Mo. L. REv. 81 (1941).
45. See Yorkshire Electricity Bd. v. Naylor, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1 (H.L.). In
reinstating the 1500 verdict of the trial judge, which had been raised to £1000 by the
Court of Appeal, Lord Devlin stated:
[£200] has been taken as if, subject to the change in the value of money, it had
been fixed by statute in 1941; and indeed the decision in Benham v. Gambling
has been described as "judicial legislation." The current figure, which in fact thejudge awarded in this case, is £500 and the evidence at the trial showed that this
was almost exactly the equivalent of £200 in 1941.
Id. at 11.
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sliding scale of awards4" akin to those found in workmen's compen-
sation legislation.
THE AMERICAN CASES
The courts of this country have, for a variety of reasons, never
explicitly recognized loss of life expectancy as an independent item of
recoverable damages.47 In the earlier cases, the claim for compensa-
tion was rejected either because the court misconceived the proper
application of the rule of Baker v. Bolton,4s because of a misplaced
delicacy which caused a recoil from the task as from something verg-
ing on blasphemy,49 or because of an uncritical adherence to earlier
precedents.5" A little later, three main lines of judicial objection were
opened up and expanded: fear of speculative awards,5 fear of duplica-
tion of damages,52 and fear of becoming involved in the experiment
which had failed so palpably in the courts of England. 3
46. See Yorkshire Electricity Bd. v. Naylor, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1, 12 (H.L.),
commented on in 83 L.Q. Rxv. 326 (1967):
It would, I think, be a great improvement if this head of damage was abolished
and replaced by a short Act of Parliament fixing a suitable sum which a wrong-
doer whose act has caused death should pay into the estate of the deceased. While
the law remains as it is, I think that it is less likely to fall into disrespect ifjudges treat Benham v. Gambling as an injunction to stick to a fixed standard
than if they start revaluing happiness, each according to his own ideas.
47. In Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960), damages were
sought for pre-natal injuries which rendered the plaintiff totally dependent for life.
The court stated: "The measure of damages in this case seems to be embraced within
three general elements: (a) compensation for the injury and resulting impairment of
mind and body, (b) compensation for the cost of care . . . and (c) deprivation of
normal life expectancy." Id. at 469. However, in awarding damages of $260,000, the
court made no breakdown of the figures, so that it is not clear how much, if anything,
was awarded for shortening of life.
48. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. E.g., Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker,
146 Ind. 600, 45 N.E. 1049, 1052 (1897), in which the defense argued the Baker v.
Bolton rule. The court stated: "[I]f the condition of the injured person is such that
a shortening of life may be apprehended, this may be considered, in determining the
extent of the injury. . . . This, however, falls far short of authorizing damages for
the loss or shortening of life itself. The value of human life cannot, as adjudged by
the common law, be measured in money." See also 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rlv. 535 (1935).
49. See Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 146 Ind. 600, 45 N.E. 1049, 1052 (1897):
"It is, besides, inconceivable that one could thus be compensated for the loss or
shortening of his own life." Compare the impassioned words of the court in Wycko
v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960):
We are aware, of course, that there are those who say that the life of a human
being is impossible to value, that although we will grapple mightily with the value
of the life of a horse, of a team of mules, we will stand aloof where a human is
concerned and assign it no value whatever. This kind of delicacy would prevent
the distribution of food to the starving because the sight of hunger is so sickening.
But we cannot shirk this difficult problem of valuation.
50. For the pervasive influence of Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 146 Ind. 600,
45 N.E. 1049 (1897), see, e.g., Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Johnson, 191 Ind. 479, 133 N.E.
732 (1922) ; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Miller, 165 Ind. 381, 74 N.E. 509 (1905)
Muncie Pulp Co. v. Hacker, 37 Ind. App. 194, 76 N.E. 770 (1906).
51. See, e.g., Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority, 92
N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1, 6 (1943) : "To allow for the enjoyment of continued life would
mean an entrance into a boundless field of arbitrary assessment, for which no policy
of the laws exists."
52. See, e.g., O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., 111 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D. Mass.
1953) : ("[R] ecovery would be based on the degree of damage not on the degree of
fault, and would presumably usually involve some financial duplication"); Rhone v.
Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 167 A.2d 773 (1961).
53. See, e.g., Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 229, 167 A.2d 773, 777 (1961) : "The
experience of the English courts with the rule and the virtual emasculation thereof
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Of the three, it is the pervasive fear of speculation on the part of
the jury which is the most difficult to fathom. The standard of cer-
tainty pursued in the area of contract damages has but doubtful appli-
cation in the field of tort claims for personal injuries.54 We have long
since outgrown the atavistic notion that the law can be concerned
only with the compensation of tangible or pecuniary losses.55 We have
come a long way toward the protection of the intangible interests of
personality. 6 "[T]hough the premise may elude detection, some deep
intuition may claim to validate this process of evaluating the imponder-
able .... Because our society sets a high value on money it uses money
or price as a means of recognizing the worth of non-economic as well
as economic goods."57 Juries are every day being called upon to per-
form feats of speculation similar to those which are apparently so
dreaded in this area; courts across the country consistently uphold jury
awards for such incommensurable elements of damage as physical pain
and mental anguish, which is properly classifiable as a species of physical
pain,58 mental suffering due to fear that an unborn baby has been de-
formed as a result of the mother's injuries,50 loss of fecundity,"0 im-
potence, 61 loss of consortium, 62 disfigurement,6 3 premature aging, 4
which has evolved from that experience, as well as the rather ephemeral considerations
which must be taken into account under it, and also the possible duplication or over-
lapping of compensation ... do not commend the English Rule to us as one for
adoption in this State."
54. See C. McCORMICK, DAMAGtS § 32, at 124 (1935): "In the tort field, [the
standard of certainty] has in fact no application at all to the measurement of damages
to interests of personality, such as claims for pain, mental anguish, or humiliation,
nor, of course, to punitive damages."
55. See, e.g., Gray v. Washington Water Power Co., 30 Wash. 665, 71 P. 206,
209 (1903): "The law ought not to grant redress alone to the businessman who
sustains commercial damage, and refuse redress to others who have sustained a more
poignant infliction." See also Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d
514 (1967), noted in 27 MD. L. Rv. 403 (1967) ; Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331,
105 N.W.2d 118 (1960) ; Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
56. Compare Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. Rev. 343 (1915), with
Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONT4MP.
PROB. 219 (1953).
57. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 224 (1953).
58. See, e.g., Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961) (jury
award of $130,000, $97,000 of which was compensation for pain and suffering and loss
of limb) ; Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960) ($15,000 for pain,
suffering and inconvenience). See also C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGXS § 88, at 316 (1935),
where the author distinguishes between "mental distress which is the accompanying
shadow of physical pain" and other forms of mental suffering such as "terror at the
time of the injury."
59. See, e.g., Occhipinti v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 252 Miss. 172, 172 So. 2d 186(1965).
60. See, e.g., Potts v. Guthrie, 282 Pa. 200, 127 A. 605 (1925).
61. See, e.g., Delaney v. New York Cent. R.R., 68 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1946);
Sullivan v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 Cal. App. 2d 745, 214 P.2d 82 (1950);
Walton v. United States Steel Corp., 362 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1962).
62. See, e.g., Price v. H.B. Green Transp. Line, 287 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1961);
Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967), noted in 27 MD.
L. lev. 403 (1967).
63. See, e.g., Gray v. Washington Power Co., 30 Wash. 665, 71 P. 206 (1903).
64. See, e.g., Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960).
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change of personality,6 5 and despair at the realization of diminished
capacity to labor.
66
Of even greater relevance, however, is a line of cases, involving
permanent injuries, in which compensation has been accorded for "loss
of enjoyment of life."6  The phrase "loss of enjoyment of life" is
strongly evocative of the British term "prospect of a predominantly
happy life" and, indeed, the difference between the two is very slight,
if not illusory. In the claim for "loss of enjoyment," damages are
sought for the qualitative impairment, the narrowing, of the type of
life the plaintiff might have expected to lead but for the accident. For
example, in Haynes v. Waterville & Oakland Street Railway,6" the
court said: "The total loss of the left hand by a boy 10 years of age
takes a great deal of usefulness and enjoyment out of his prospective
life. The loss of earning power is by no means the extent of the in-
jury."6 9 In these cases, it is not the loss of one or two "measurable
components" for which recovery is sought, such as the inability to dance
or bowl, although such elements are presented to the jury in an attempt
to provide some kind of anchor for its deliberations; rather, recovery
is sought on account of the general limiting of horizons, for experi-
ences never to be had, for the compression of plaintiff's life into a
narrower channel than it might naturally have taken. As if to under-
score this distinction, the majority of the court in Hogan v. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co.7" refused to allow damages to an accom-
plished violinist for loss of enjoyment from inability to play the violin
following injury to her hand. The dissent, however, refused to acknow-
ledge the distinction:
The great majority of courts, and in my opinion on sounder
reasoning, have generally allowed recovery for "loss of enjoy-
ment," or "loss of enjoyment of life." Obviously, if recovery may
be had for injury which results generally in the loss of the en-joyment of life, then recovery cannot be withheld where compen-
sation is sought for only one of such enjoyments as in the
instant case.
71
In the "loss of enjoyment" cases, no evidence is adduced to prove
curtailment of the span of life and none is in fact claimed. In award-
65. See, e.g., Wright v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 253 F. Supp. 811 (D.S.C. 1966) ;Delaney v. New York Cent. R.R., 68 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Fjellman v.
Weller, 213 Minn. 457, 7 N.W.2d 521 (1943).
66. See, e.g., Rome Ry. & Light Co. v. Duke, 26 Ga. App. 52, 105 S.E. 386 (1920).
67. See, e.g., Kasiski v. Central Power & Light Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 130, 132 A. 201(Super. Ct. 1926) ; Bassett v. Milwaukee, Northern Ry., 169 Wis. 152, 170 N.W. 944(1919). But see King's Indiana Billiard Co. v. Winters, 123 Ind. App. 110, 106 N.E.2d
713 (1952) ; Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Ray, 167 Ind. 236, 78 N.E. 978 (1906) ; Town of
Belleview v. England, 118 S.W. 994 (Ky. 1909). See also Annot., 120 A.L.R. 535(1939) ; Smith, Psychic Interest in Continuation of One's Own Life: Legal Recogni-
tion and Protection, 98 U. PA. L. Rnv. 781, 789 (1950) : "To assess the dimensions ofinterests of personality we are bound by common sense to multiply the breadth of life
by its length."
68. 101 Me. 335, 64 A. 614 (1906).
69. 64 A. at 615.
70. 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938).
71. 85 P.2d at 36.
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ing damages, however, the jury is at least implicitly aware that it must
compensate a loss which will continue for the rest of the plaintiff's
life, so that there is, subliminally at least, a time factor involved in
its calculations. In practice, this time factor is revealed to the jury
by the instructions of the court. From the language of the decisions,
it is not altogether clear whether "loss of enjoyment" has been com-
pensated independently, or as an attribute of mental suffering.72 If it
has been compensated independently, then the case for independent
recognition of loss of life expectancy is significantly strengthened,
since, arguably, loss of life expectancy damages are merely loss of
enjoyment damages awarded for a longer period of time. Assuming
that loss of enjoyment is an element of mental suffering, as appears
more likely, the court will instruct the jury to award damages on
the basis of the plaintiff's life expectancy at the time of the trial,
not at the time of the injury.73 The theory, if not the practice, of the
law here is strictly compensatory, not punitive. Recovery is permitted
only for such mental suffering or loss of enjoyment as the plaintiff
will actually experience. Thus, if this were a case involving evidence
of diminution of life span, no damages could be had for the suffering
which would have been experienced in the years never to be lived.
By contrast, in the English cases, the time factor is from the out-
set, as it were, made the star of the piece. The claim is, nominally,
not for the narrowing of life, but for its shortening. Yet, as we have
seen, by the time the issue is submitted to the jury, the significance
of the actual number of years lost is muted. The jury is to shun the
actuarial test; the thing to be valued is not the "prospect of length of
days" but the "prospect of a predominantly happy life." The result is,
as one critic has aptly observed, that the term "expectation of life," as
used to describe these cases, is grossly misleading. 74 What the jury is
actually being asked to appraise is the loss of "expectation of happiness."
From even this brief comparison, it should be apparent that
American juries have long been doing precisely the same job as their
English counterparts, and precisely that from which wary judges have
sought to insulate them - a thorough-going job of speculation about
72. In Delaney v. New York Cent. R.R., 68 F. Supp. 70, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1946),
the court, in listing the various elements of compensable damage which the jury had
considered, mentioned both the loss of the ability to "enjoy a normal life" and the
"mental anguish" endured in the past and likely to be endured in the future. However,
in Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Ray, 167 Ind. 236, 78 N.E. 978, 980 (1906), the court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff because the trial judge's charge erroneously led
the jury to understand ". . . that it was proper for them to consider, as a separate
element of damages, independent and distinct from mental suffering, the plaintiff's
past and future deprivation of the freedom of action and social intercourse with
her friends .. "
73. See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAcES § 86, at 303-04 (1935) ; Borcherding v. Eklund,
156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643, 650 (1952) :
In an action for damages for personal injuries which are permanent and have
impaired the earning capacity, damages for pecuniary loss by reason of decreased
earning power are to be based on life expectancy immediately before the injury
and for future mental and physical suffering on probable expectancy of life in
plaintiff's injured condition.
See also Dark v. Brinkman, 136 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1962) ; Webb v. Omaha & S.I.
Ry., 101 Neb. 596, 164 N.W. 564 (1917).
74. See Kahn-Freund, Expectation of Happiness, 5 MoD. L. Rtv. 81 (1941).
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the content of human existence. The difference, if difference there
be, lies not in the system of calculation employed by the two juries,
but only in the units of measurement which each is expected to
manipulate. The American jury must measure "partial loss of the
good of life over the normal period of life . .. [whereas the English
jury must measure] ... total loss of the good of life over part of the
normal period of life." 5 The knowledge, experience, common sense
or intuition which is brought to bear in solving the first equation is
no different from that which is requisite for solving the second.
An American court which is really convinced of the worthiness
of a cause of action for the shortening of life could achieve the desired
result of independent compensation within this established body of
precedent by the simple expedient of varying a small segment of its
charge to the jury. In a proper case, the court need only instruct the
jury that in estimating the loss of enjoyment of life occasioned by
the injury, it must stretch its deliberations to cover the period of the
lost years, during which a total loss of enjoyment will have been sus-
tained. Precise accuracy in the result need not be contemplated:
Perfection or infallibility in this regard has never been required
by the profession. Such precision is not even required from
appellate courts when dealing with excessive verdicts. In such
cases [they] reduce the verdict if sufficiently excessive to shock
the conscience of the court and [they] reduce it to the extent
where it will not shock [their] conscience to permit it to stand. 76
It must, therefore, be assumed that in failing to adopt this simple
expedient, in summoning up instead the spectre of undue speculation,
our courts are expressing doubt not about whether the calculation can
be made, but about whether it ought to be made.
If still further evidence is required to demonstrate that the true
source of judicial opposition lies elsewhere than in the fear of specula-
tion, it is conclusively furnished by the manner in which these same
American courts permit compensation for the loss of earning capacity.
Here, the jury is instructed to base its calculations on the plaintiff's
normal life expectancy at the time of the injury, rather than his life
expectancy at the time of the trial,77 so that, if this were a case in-
volving diminution of life span, recovery could be had for the loss
of earning capacity sustained during the years never to be lived. More-
over, lest it be contended that the degree of speculation involved in
appraising probable loss of future earnings is minimal because the
plaintiff's pre-injury earnings provide a solid point of reference, it
need only be pointed out that recovery for loss of earning capacity
is possible even where it is shown that the plaintiff is actually earning
75. Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 859 (emphasis added).
76. Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28, 35 (1938).
77. See Prairie Creek Coal Mining Co. v. Kittrell, 106 Ark. 138, 153 S.W. 89
(1912) ; Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643 (1952); C. MCCOR-
MIcK, DAMAGES § 86, at 303-04 (1935) ; Comment, The Measure of Damages for a
Shortened Life, 22 U. CHi. L. Rgv. 505 (1955).
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more money after the accident than before.7 8  Here, too, the jury
must scan the future, with its inevitable crests and hollows, not merely
of the individual plaintiff, but of the industrial society in which he
will, presumably, find himself handicapped, and, with perspicacity,
predict his losses.
Indeed, in the recent case of Downie v. United States Lines Co.,79
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit surmounted the fear of
speculative damages and apparently authorized independent recovery
for curtailment of life expectancy. While the court rejected plaintiff's
argument that loss of life expectancy is per se compensable, because
the damages under a per se theory would be too speculative, it con-
cluded that damages for curtailment of life expectancy could be awarded
if they were based on "measurable components of injury."80 The court
reasoned that since a shortened life expectancy is a kind of "perma-
nent disability," the traditional rules for the calculation of other perma-
nent disabilities, such as the loss of a limb, could be applied to
compensate a plaintiff whose expected life span is tortiously curtailed.
In such a case, the jury would be instructed as to the factors it may
consider in computing damages, such as the "inability to dance, bowl,
swim or engage in . . . the usual family activities."'" Under this
approach, the jury calculates each component separately and then com-
bines the results to reach the total award. Unlike the "loss of enjoy-
ment" standard, the Downie rule apparently measures the total loss
of the enjoyment of life, calculated by adding the measurable com-
ponents, over the years which the plaintiff has lost as a result of the
defendant's tortious conduct.82
A second basis of judicial resistance to independent compensation
for loss of life expectancy is the pervasive fear of duplication of
78. See, e.g., Tullos v. Corley, 337 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff earning
$3.50 more per week after the accident than before) ; Bochar v. J.B. Martin Motors,
Inc., 374 Pa. 240, 97 A.2d 813, 815 (1953): "Parity of wages . . . standing alone ...
is inconclusive. . . . It is not the status of the immediate present which determines
capacity for remunerative employment. Where permanent injury is involved, the whole
span of life must be considered. Has the economic horizon . . . been shortened . . .?"
79. 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 897 (1966). The plaintiff in
Downie, a fifty-two year old seaman, suffered a heart attack aboard the defendant's
vessel, which was in port. The pharmacist's mate, aware of plaintiff's symptoms,
negligently permitted him to move about the ship and then instructed him to seek
treatment at a hospital approximately one mile away. The exertion from plaintiff's
walk to the hospital seriously aggravated plaintiff's heart condition. As a result, his
normal life expectancy of eighteen years, already reduced to approximately twelve
years by the heart attack, was further shortened to about eight years. The plaintiff
brought an action for damages under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 668 (1964), for the
negligent aggravation of his heart ailment and the consequent curtailment of his life
expectancy. Although the jury indicated that $25,000 of the total award granted to
plaintiff represented a special award for prospective loss of life, the trial judge elimi-
nated that amount from the damages awarded to plaintiff. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed the trial court decision and remanded for a new trial on
the issue of damages, holding that an award for curtailment of life expectancy, based
on measurable components of damages, was permissible.
80. 359 F.2d at 347.
81. Id. at 347 n.3.
82. Chief Judge Kalodner, in dissent, suggested that adherence to this view would
produce a rash of appeals based upon the trial judge's failure to include all of the
myriad "measurable components" in his charge. In lieu of this fragmented approach
he advocated submission of the issue of shortened life span to the jury as a separate
element of damages, with a separate ascertainable value. Id. at 348.
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damages. While a separate recovery for the lost years is denied by
American courts, evidence of curtailment of life is almost always
admissible as bearing on the severity of the injury and on the degree
of mental suffering occasioned thereby."8 In Rhone v. Fisher,4 the
Maryland Court of Appeals, while declining to adopt the British rule,
upheld the following typical charge by the trial judge:
[Y]ou may not consider as an element of damage the probable
loss in years of life .... [T]he law does not permit any recovery
for any such foreshortened life expectancy, if there be any. You
may, however, consider this evidence in determining the serious-
ness of the injury and the consequent pain and suffering and the
mental anguish, if any, to which the plaintiff has been and will
be subjected in the future.85
As a backward glance at the discussion of the British difficulty with
the Slater v. Spreag rationale will reveal, 6 loss of life and mental an-
guish in contemplation of such loss are two separate injuries, logically
as distinct as the loss of a limb and the mental anguish resulting there-
from. If the curtailment of life span is being considered for independent
recovery, a similar distinction, between the curtailment itself and the
mental anguish resulting therefrom, can be readily pressed on the jury's
attention in the course of remarks from the bench in order to defeat
inflation of the award for mental anguish where awareness of loss is
lacking. As a practical matter, it is disquieting to conceive of the
rendering of inconsistent verdicts in equally meritorious cases where
the force of circumstances has blunted or withheld awareness from
one plaintiff, in all likelihood a child, but not from the other. Never-
theless, assuming the avoidance of double damages to be a commend-
able aim, the logical distinction must be made.
The fear of duplication begins to acquire more substance, how-
ever, when it is recalled that evidence of curtailment of life bears
directly on the nature and extent of the injury. A jury, having once
been exposed to so dramatic a revelation as that of premature death,
is scarcely likely to forget it. Even more remote is the possibility that
the jury will be able successfully to segregate evidence of the lost years
from evidence of the gravity of the injury in order to "save" the former
for compensation under a separate category. In truth, there appears
to be no logically compelling reason for the jury to do so. Jurists
and laymen can agree that an injury which takes ten years from a
man's life is simply a more serious injury than one which leaves his
life span intact. If the jury's instinctive reaction to this evidence is
reinforced by overt instruction from the bench to consider it in apprais-
ing the extent of the injury, then this evidence will doubtless be
reflected in the sum awarded. What then would be the effect of re-
quiring the jury to show separately what it had awarded for the lost
amenities of life? One forceful advocate of independent recognition
83. See, e.g., Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 146 Ind. 600, 45 N.E. 1049 (1897).
84. 224 Md. 223, 167 A.2d 773 (1961).
85. Id. at 225, 167 A.2d at 775.
86. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
[VOL. XXIX
1969] COMPENSATION FOR SHORTENED LIFE EXPECTANCY 37
of lost life expectancy damages has suggested that the only result would
be to expose the jury's arithmetic to the scrutiny of the court:
Once in, such evidence becomes one of those indeterminate
factors which operate, sub rosa, to inflate awards unpredictably.
By recognizing wrongful shortening of life expectancy as a sepa-
rate element of damages, a covertly compensated factor may be
catalogued and subjected to judicial control in respect to the inade-
quacy or excessiveness of damages actually being allowed for it."'
There is, admittedly, a degree of cogency to this argument. Against it,
however, must be juxtaposed the following not unlikely possibility:
the jury has awarded a reasonable sum for the physical injury sus-
tained, which reflects the fact that this injury will hasten the plaintiff's
death. The jury is then asked to consider separately what the plaintiff
has lost by having these years torn from his life. It considers both
the number of years involved and its own objective appraisal of their
content, and, again, arrives at a conservative sum. The trial judge
suspects that the same evidence has influenced the recovery under each
category, but as neither sum is shockingly excessive, he declines to
interfere. The appellate court likewise applies the rule of conscience88
and affirms. The defendant has paid twice over, but on a record suffi-
ciently tidy to delight the soul of an accountant. The possibility of
precisely such occurrences has seemed sufficiently imminent to Ameri-
can judges to foster their continuing resistance to the rule of inde-
pendent recovery.
The British have displayed only minimal apprehension over the
possibility of this type of duplication, 9 probably because of the low
ceiling imposed by the Benham case, and subsequent British decisions,
on damages for curtailment of life expectancy. Instead, because so
many of the actions involving shortening of life have been brought,
not by the living victim himself, but by his personal representative,
what has concerned British courts has been the possibility of a two-
fold recovery for this item, once under the survival statute and then
again in a claim for wrongful death. Theoretically, such double re-
covery is impossible.9" There has been a strict differentiation of the
types of losses compensable in each type of suit; Lord Campbell's Act
allocated to the dependents only such pecuniary losses as they sustained
by virtue of the death. The intangible loss of the right to go on living
was allocated to the estate. Yet, in the usual case, the heirs and the
dependents are likely to be the same individuals, so that any financial
gain to the estate is available for the benefit of the dependents. Figura-
87. Smith, Psychic Interest in Continuation of One's Own Life: Legal Recog-
nition and Protection, 98 U. PA. L. RZv. 781, 822 (1950).
88. See Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28, 35
(1938) (dissent).
89. See, e.g., Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354, 368: "A further difficulty of
application is this, that it seems to me extremely hard to avoid the danger of giving
a plaintiff compensation for the same thing more than once under various heads
of damage."
90. See Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW V
tively, the money has been paid into the same pocket. 1 Ignoring the
outraged theorists and bent on a stolidly practical performance, the
British have solved this dilemma by providing that any recovery
obtained under the survival statute is to be deducted from the award
which is given in the wrongful death action. 2
CONCLUSION
What, then, should be extracted from this British adventure, which
has helped nourish the reluctance of our own judiciary to accord inde-
pendent recovery for the loss of a part of a man's future? We need not
re-enact the British drama step by step from the beginning; we can
begin where they left off. It should be taken as established that cur-
tailment of life is, short of "death on the instant," the most grievous of
all possible injuries, and that a system which permits recovery for loss
of fecundity but denies it for premature death can lay no claim to rational
consistency. Attention should be focused exclusively on the appropriate
means for achieving just and adequate compensation.
If we choose to compensate loss of life expectancy overtly and
separately, we have the means within easy reach. In practice, we are
already making partial compensation for the lost years by including
them in the period for which loss of earning capacity is calculated.
This, however, leaves uncompensated the intangible, non-pecuniary
aspects of the injury. To grant redress for these, we need only turn
to the existing category of "loss of enjoyment." By interpreting this
concept flexibly and, in appropriate cases, reading into it a certain
element of objective loss, we can stretch it to accommodate even a
child's lack of total awareness of the extent of his injury. We need
then only expand the period of measurement currently used in evaluat-
ing "loss of enjoyment" damages to include the span of the lost
expectancy. The "loss of enjoyment" approach, applied to curtailment
of life span, seeks to measure damages by considering loss of life span
as a whole, independent of the specific components of loss. Because
of the obvious danger of speculative damages under such an approach,
American courts, like their British counterparts, may be tempted to
place an arbitrary ceiling on such awards, thus reducing the computa-
tion of damages for loss of life expectancy to a mechanical level. Such
an eventuality could, perhaps, be avoided by adopting the "sum of the
measurable components" approach espoused in the Downie case.
Under either approach, however, courts will run the risk of dupli-
cation of damages, since the evidence of curtailment of life will un-
doubtedly have influenced the jury's deliberations on the seriousness
of the injury and inflated its award. In addition, to base damages
for "loss of enjoyment" on pre-injury life expectancy is to blur even
further the distinction between the civil and the criminal law.93 "Loss
91. See, e.g., Feay v. Barnwell, [1938] 1 All E.R. 31, 36 (K.B.): "It seems
to me clear that, as the estate of the widow is, by reason of my judgment, £600 better
off than it otherwise would have been, and that amount goes to the benefit of the
husband, I must make allowance for it.
92. Id.
93. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 228 (1953).
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of enjoyment" is apparently viewed as a species of mental suffering.
The rationale of present practice in this regard is essentially compensa-
tory; the jury is to furnish a solatium to ease the burden of the plain-
tiff's remaining life insofar as it is possible to do so with money. What
purpose, however, is served by awarding a sum for loss of enjoyment
in the years never to be lived? Where the victim is still alive at the
time of the trial, it may be argued with some justification that, as the
loss to him is a real one, the additional sum awarded will simply pro-
vide additional solace. Where, however, the action is by the executor
or administrator under the survival statute, the money will actually
be paid to people who have personally suffered no such loss except in
abstract theory.94 Only a desire to punish the wrongdoer by making
it as expensive for him to kill as to injure could justify the granting
of such recoveries. It must, therefore, be remembered that, since death
merely renders certain that which was open to some doubt while the
victim remained alive, namely, the actual amount of life expectancy
lost by the deceased, to accord independent recovery for this item
would have the effect of making it a standard item of damages in
every suit brought under the survival statute. That is, in a large
percentage of the cases, damages independently awarded for loss of
life will have been transmuted into something startlingly resembling
punitive or exemplary damages. While the punitive element often
enters into the consideration of negligence damages as a matter of
practice, this seems, at best, a rather dubious end for such a lofty ideal.
As to the living plaintiff, it is inconceivable that, having suffered
injury serious enough to have shortened his life, he will be turned away
empty-handed. The controversy raging around him is not whether
he will collect anything at all, but only whether he will collect enough.
For all the spiralling rhetoric, the question of compensation for the
diminution of life expectancy is nothing but a question of the adequacy
of jury awards in personal injury cases. The notoriously large re-
coveries of recent years would seem to indicate that plaintiffs' rights
have been, hitherto, adequately, if sometimes covertly, safeguarded.
Nevertheless, when it is the injured party who stands at the bar, and
not his personal representative, the risk of duplication, minimized as
much as possible by the charge, should be run, and the jury instructed
to award damages for curtailment of life span based on the period of
his pre-injury life expectancy. Only consistency, not justice, would
argue for similar treatment in the survival suit. It is doubtful justice
that "the satisfaction of the theorists' desire for elegant jurisprudence
should . . . be purchased with other people's money.' 95
Gloria Belgrad
94. See, e.g., Yorkshire Electricity Bd. v. Naylor, [19671 2 All E.R. 1, 12 (H.L.)
The law has endeavored to avoid two results, both of which it considered would
be undesirable. The one is that a wrongdoer should have to pay large sums for
disabling and nothing at all for killing; the other is that the large sum appro-
priate to total disablement should come as a windfall to the beneficiaries of the
victim's estate.
95. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW &
CONT4MP. PROB. 219, 226 (1953).
